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"Grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency.
when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure."?
-Justice Thurgood Marshall, 1989
I. INTRODUCTION
The tragic events of September 11,2001 shocked the nation with their
incomprehensible devastation and the stunning message of America's
domestic vulnerability. At no time in recent memory, if ever, had
Americans felt so threatened on their own soil. Because this was not the
act of any identifiable geographic state, America was initially powerless
to retaliate using its unparalleled military forces. Clearly, however, urgent
measures were needed to restore domestic security. Congress quickly
responded with the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 2 Terrorism Act,
commonly known as the USA PATRIOT Act (USAPA).
This Essay examines the USAPA, in particular its effects on cyber
communications and Fourth Amendment guarantees againstunreasonable

* For Sam.
1. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
2. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter

USAPA].
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
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searches and seizures. Part II examines the provisions of the USAPA that
most directly affect computer privacy. Part III discusses the history of
crisis-driven legislation designed to enhance national security by trimming
civil liberties. The final section evaluates the legislation, its effects, and
appropriateness.
Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. introduced the bill in the
House in response to the September 1lth hijackings and subsequent
attacks on the World Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon.4 The USAPA
broadens the authority of the intelligence-gathering and criminal
investigative branches of government in the areas of electronic taps and
traces, immigration, and border patrols.' Citing the urgent need for new
"tools" to fight terrorism, 6 Attorney General John Ashcroft exhorted
Congress to pass the 243-page bill within a week.7
After the House Judiciary Committee amended the bill to better
comport with constitutional guarantees,' House Speaker Dennis Hastert
and other Republican leaders scuttled it in favor of a new bill,9 in a process
described as "one of the most undemocratic breakdowns in the history of
our legislative process."1
Under pressure to react to the events of September 1lth, and operating
from temporary offices as a result of the threat of anthrax contamination,"
Congress passed the measure with "few hearings and little debate.' 2 The
vote was 357 to 66 in the House.' 3 Representative John Conyers
complained that only two copies of the bill were made available to the
Democrats before the vote, providing little opportunity for lawmakers to

Id.
4. See Allison L. de Cerreflo, Section 208 ofthe PATRIOTAct Walking a FineLine Between
Security and Free Exchange of Scientists and Knowledge, available at
http://members.nyas.org/events/policy/pol_0 1_1 023.html (last modified Oct. 26, 2001).
5. Id.
6. See Jim McGee, An IntelligenceGiantin the Making;Anti-Terrorism Law Likelyto Bring
Domestic Apparatus of UnprecedentedScope, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at A4.
7. Nat Hentoff, Why Should We Care? It's Only the Constitution: Terrorizingthe Bill of
Rights, THE VILLAGE VOICE 3 (Nov. 9, 2001), at http://www.villagevoice.comlissues/0146/
hentoff.php.
8. Id. 4.
9. Id. 9.
10. Id. 3.
11. See Robert Scheer, With Powers Like These, Can Repression Be FarBehind?, L.A.
TIMES, 1, 7 (Oct. 30,2001), at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-sheer30oct30.story.
12. Laura Donohue & Jim Walsh, PatriotAct-A Remedyfor an UnidentifiedProblem,SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON. (Oct. 30, 2001), at A17, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/chroniclearchive/2001/10/30/ED 10681 .DTL.
13. Stefanie Olsen, PatriotAct Draws Privacy Concerns, CNET NEWS.COM: TECH NEWS
FIRST 3 (Oct. 26, 2001), at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1 005-200-7671240.html.
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comprehend its implications. 4 Representative Barney Frank, one of the
drafters of the Judiciary Committee changes that were removed from the
final draft, characterized the vote as "the least democratic process for
debating questions fundamental to democracy I have ever seen. A bill
drafted by a handful of people in secret, subject to no committee process,
comes before us immune from amendment.' 5 "Why should we care?"
remarked Representative David Obey, "It's only the Constitution."' 6
The Senate passed the bill by an overwhelming 96-1 vote.1 7 Senator
Russell Feingold, the lone dissenter in the Senate, remarked that "few in
Congress had even read summaries, let alone the fine print, of the
document they so hastily passed."' 8 Apparently, dissent was stifled by the
reluctance of lawmakers to appear "soft on terrorism." 9
II. USAPA PROVISIONS
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.
Ways may some day be developed by which the Government,
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce
them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a
jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.... Can it be
that the Constitution affords no protection against such
invasions of individual security? 0
-Justice Louis Brandeis, 1928.
The chief areas examined in this Essay concern the expansion of
surveillance powers in wiretaps, search warrants, and subpoenas. Many of
these have not only been expanded, but threshold requirements have been
either lowered or removed for many types of searches by broadening the
scope of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Additionally,
judicial approval for many searches has been reduced to a rubber stamp if
the request is properly submitted.
A great deal of the USAPA focuses on the Internet." This may be due
to the extreme danger cyber crimes pose to the economy and to the
Department of Defense (DOD), which maintains a network of over two

14. See Hentoff, supra note 7, 5.
15. Id. 7.
16. Id. 6.
17. Id. 9.

18.
19.
20.
21.

Scheer, supranote 11, 7.
Donohue & Walsh, supra note 12.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See generally USAPA, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 5
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

million computers, 10,000 local area networks, and 100 long-distance
networks, which handle 95% of military communications.22 In 1999 alone
the DOD was the target of 22,126 detected attacks, which may have
represented only a small percentage of actual intrusions. 23 Nearly all of the
attempted unauthorized entries were the work of "fledgling hackers" who
target the DOD because of the prestige of evading its protections.24 But
whether hackers or terrorists, the danger is real.
One example occurred in 1997, when a teen hacker disrupted a
telephone loop in Massachusetts, interrupting telephone service in
hundreds of homes as well as the control tower at Worcester Airport.
Several hours passed before technicians could locate the problem, and it
took more than a year to implement countermeasures. 26 Another example
occurred in 1994, when two hackers breached an Air Force computer
network at a research facility in upstate New York.27 The hackers were not
detected for five days, and repeatedly breached the network over a period
of several months.28 Investigators followed the trail to multiple locations
around the United States, South America and, finally, Great Britain.29
These hackers entered multiple government facilities, including NASA,
and several private entities such as defense contractors, and downloaded
sensitive information.3" The cost of responding to this intrusion was
estimated at half a million dollars.3
The dangers ofcyber crime are difficult to overstate. Though not agents
of any hostile power, many amateur hackers will publish the classified
information that they are able to access in order to demonstrate their
hacking abilities.32 This permits the information to be accessed by anyone,
including potential enemies. Also, terrorists could disrupt military
operations by substituting munitions orders for other supplies such as light
bulbs, thereby rendering military installations unprepared for combat.33
22. Lt. Col. Joginder S. Dhillon & Lt. Col. Robert I. Smith, Defensive Information
Operationsand Domestic Law: Limitations on Government Investigative Techniques, 50 A.F. L.
REV. 135, 140 (2001).
23. See id.The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) routinely conducts attacks on
the military's computer networks to gauge their vulnerability. Id. Of 38,000 attempts by DISA,
nearly two out of three were successful, and, of these, only four percent of the unauthorized
intrusions Were detected by the DOD. Id.
24. Id. at 141.
25. Id. at 141-42.
26. Id. at 142.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 143.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 141.
33. Id. at 144.
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According to the FBI, in addition to the threat to national defense,
electronic crime costs more than ten billion dollars per year.34 Many
businesses that are targeted never realize that they have been victimized,
and of those, many simply do not report the crimes for fear of negative
publicity.3" The perpetrators of electronic crimes are elusive and may
operate from anywhere in the world.
On October 26, 2001, at the signing of the USAPA, President Bush
addressed the novel issues raised by new technology and the government's
response:
As of today, we're changing the laws governing informationsharing. And as importantly, we're changing the culture of
our various agencies that fight terrorism. Countering and
investigating terrorist activity is the number one priority for
both law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
Surveillance of communications is another essential tool to
pursue and stop terrorists. The existing law was written in the
era of rotary telephones. This new law that I sign today will
allow surveillance of all communications used by terrorists,
including e-mails, the Internet, and cell phones.
As of today, we'll be able to better meet the technological
challenges posed by this proliferation of communications
technology. Investigations are often slowed by limits on the
reach of federal search warrants. Law enforcement agencies
have to get a new warrant for each new district they
investigate, even when they're after the same suspect.
Under this new law, warrants are valid across all districts and
across all states.36
The Fourth Amendment requires that a search warrant specify the
"place to be searched."37 In order to search a place other than that
specified, a new search warrant typically must be obtained.38 While the
primary effect of this "particularity" requirement is to eliminate general
warrants, it also prevents law enforcement authorities from "forum

34. Id. at 139.
35. Id, at 140.
36. George W. Bush, Address at the White House signing of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
(Oct. 26, 2001), availableat http:www.pbs.orgfnewshour/bb/terrorism/bushterrorismbill.html.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
38. How the USA-PATRIOT Act Limits Judicial Oversight of Telephone and Internet
Surveillance, ACLU FREEDOM NETWORK 7 (Oct. 23, 2001), at http://wwv.aclu.org/congress/
1102301 g.html [hereinafter Judicial Oversight].
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shopping" by only giving the judge in the relevant jurisdiction the
discretion to grant or deny the request for a warrant.3 9 But, section 216 of
the USAPA40 permits a judge or magistrate to issue a pen register or trap
and trace order that does not specify the Internet service provider (ISP),
leaving it to the law enforcement officer to insert one or more ISPs of his
choice. 4' This order is valid anywhere in the United States. 42 An ancillary
effect of this provision is that if an ISP challenges the effect of the order,
it must present the challenge in the jurisdiction where the order was issued,
which could be across the country.43 With little to gain, few ISPs are likely
to bring such a challenge. 4
45 the Supreme Court ruled that the installation
In Smith v. Maryland,
and use of a pen register was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.46
A pen register is defined as "a mechanical device that records the numbers
dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when
the dial on the telephone is released." ' In Smith, the defendant appealed
his robbery conviction that was based on incriminating telephone company
records. 4' Following the robbery, the defendant had made repeated
telephone calls to his victim. 49 Based on information obtained from the

39. See id.
40. USAPA, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Section 216 (b)(1)(a)(1) reads:
(1) Attorney for the govemment.-Upon an application made under section
3122(a)(1), the court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and
use of a pen register or trap and trace device anywhere within the United States,
if the court finds that the attorney for the Government has certified to the court
that the information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant
to an ongoing criminal investigation. The order, upon service of that order, shall
apply to any person or entity providing wire or electronic communication service
in the United States whose assistance may facilitate the execution of the order.
Whenever such an order is served on any person or entity not specifically named
in the order, upon request of such person or entity, the attorney for the
Government or law enforcement or investigative officer that is serving the order
shall provide written or electronic certification that the order applies to the person
or entity being served.
Id.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Judicial Oversight,supra note 38,
Id.
See id.
See id.
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Id. at 745-46.
Id. at736n.l.
Id. at 737-38.
Id. at 737.

8.
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telephone company pen register, police obtained a search warrant for his
residence that yielded incriminating evidence. °
On appeal, the defendant sought to exclude "all fiuits derived from the
52
pen register 5' because the police installed the device without a warrant.
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that there was "no constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed into a
telephone system and hence no search within the Fourth Amendment." 3
Before the passage ofthe USAPA, there was considerable debate about
the applicability of the Smith pen register categorization to the Internet.
Section 216 of the USAPA simply inserts the appropriate language to
analogize the routing of electronic communications on the Internet to the
dialing of a phone. This permits enforcement officials to obtain such
information as web addresses, e-mail addresses, and session times based
on a lower standard than the probable cause necessary for a search
warrant; the agent must merely certify that the information is "relevant to
an ongoing criminal investigation."5 5 The USAPA obligates the court to
issue the warrant if this basic requirement is met.56
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 738. The Court relied on the two-pronged analysis of subjective and objective
expectations of privacy that was applied in Katz v. UnitedStates, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Id. at 73940; see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, & n.12 (1978); id. at 150, 151 (Powell, J.,
concurring); id. at 164 (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977);
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,442 (1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14(1973);
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752
(1971) (stating a plurality opinion); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364,368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
54. USAPA, Pub. L.No. 107-56, § 216,115 Stat. 272 (2001). Section 216, MODIFICATION
OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO USE OF PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE
DEVICES, reads:
(a) General Limitations.-Section 3121(c) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended(1) by inserting "or trap and trace device" after "pen register";
(2) by inserting, "routing, addressing," after "dialing"; and
(3) by striking"call processing" and inserting"the processing and transmitting
of wire or electronic communications so as not to include the contents of any wire
or electronic communications."
Id. § 216(a)(I)-(3).
55. Judicial Oversight,supranote 38, 3.
56. USAPA, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216. The section reads:
Upon an application made under section 3122(a)(1), the court shall enter an ex
parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace
device anywhere within the United States, if the court finds that the attorney for
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But the analogy to telephone records is flawed. In order to appreciate
the distinction, a basic understanding of the Internet is helpful. Rather than
directly linking all of the computers of users, the Internet is able to
function as it does by employing a technology known as packet
switching.57 This technology breaks data down into small packets of
information, which are then transmitted and reassembled in the correct
order at the destination computer."8 The packets are encoded at the source
for correct reassembly, permitting them to utilize the most efficient routing
along the way.59
The Smith opinion, citing UnitedStates v. New York Telephone Co.,60
reasoned that pen register-supplied information was not private because
"[iut does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether
calls are actually completed.' Conversely, because the information
contained in e-mail messages is transmitted in packets, whoever intercepts
the message must separate the address from the contents of the e-mail.62
The FBI responds to invasion of privacy concerns by asserting that they
can be trusted to separate address from content and retain only the
former.63
Perhaps the Smith decision would have been different if telephone
numbers were spoken into the receiver, rather than dialed, and law
enforcement officials had to separate the numbers from the remainder of
the conversation. 64 Even without these issues, the Smith dissent was bitter
in its concern for Fourth Amendment guarantees.65 Justices Stewart and
Brennan worried that "[tihe information captured by such surveillance
emanates from private conduct within a person's home or
office-locations that without question are entitled to Fourth and

the Government has certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained
by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.
Id. § 216(b)(1) (emphasis added).
57. Dhillon & Smith, supra note 22, at 138.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
61. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n. 1 (1979) (quoting New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S.
at 161 n.1).
62. JudicialOversight, supra note 38, 5.
63. Id.
64. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 741. "[A] pen register differs significantly from the listening
device employed in Katz [(Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (ruling that a wiretap of
telephone booth was a search))], for pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications."
Id.
65. See id. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Fourteenth Amendment protection. 66 The Smith case has been frequently
criticized for its narrowing of the expectation of privacy.67
The Smith opinion's analysis of the subjective expectation of privacy68
takes on a new irony in light of the provisions of the USAPA. While
discussing whether an individual's expectation of privacy is "reasonable,"
"legitimate," or "justifiable, 69 the Court hypothesized a situation.where
a subjective expectation would not suffice as a standard for
reasonableness.
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz' twopronged inquiry would provide an inadequate index of Fourth
Amendment protection. For example, if the Government were
suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes
henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals
thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of
privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects. Similarly,
if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this
Nation's traditions, erroneously assumed that police were
continuously monitoring his telephone conversations, a
subjective expectation ofprivacy regarding the contents of his
calls might be lacking as well. In such circumstances, where
an individual's subjective expectations had. been
"conditioned" by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations
obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was. In
determining whether a "legitimate expectation of privacy"
existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be proper.7"

66. Id (Stewart, J., dissenting).
67. See, e.g., People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 141 (Colo. 1983) ("A telephone
subscriber... has an actual expectation that the dialing of telephone numbers from a home
telephone will be free from governmental intrusion."); CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND
EAVESDROPPING § 28.1, at 279 (Cummulative Supp. 1994) ("unrestricted use of pen registers by
the police would have a substantial and deleterious effect on privacy"); WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOuRTH AMENDMENT § 2.7, at 153-55 (Supp. 1986)
(contending that individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy in telephone records);
Comment, Pen RegistersAfter Smith v. Maryland, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.753 (1980).
68. Smith, 492 U.S. at 740.
69. IA The Court cites as examples: Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, & n. 12 (1978); id.
dissenting); United States v. Chadwick,
at 150, 151 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 164 (White, J.,
433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); UnitedStatesv. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,442 (1976); United States v. Dionisio,
410 U.S. 1, 14(1973); Couchv. UnitedStates,409 U.S. 322,335-36 (1973); UnitedStates v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (providing aplurality opinion); Mancusiv. DeForte,392 U.S. 364,368
(1968); and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). Smith, 492 U.S. at 740.
70. Id. at 741 n.5.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 5
FLORIDA LAWRE VIEW

[Vol. 54

With the enactment of the USAPA, the government has enacted such
provisions, many ofwhich are being criticized as "alien to well-recognized
Fourth Amendment freedoms."'" Considering that today many people
maintain their "papers and effects" on their computer hard drives, the
expansion of pen register authority to include electronic communications
and Internet usage can "mean the collection of information more private
than IP addresses, which are roughly the Net's equivalent of phone
numbers."72
Attorney General John Ashcroft argues that roving wiretaps, which are
permitted by section 206 of the USAPA,73 do not violate the Fourth
Amendment because they "do not eliminate the particularity
requirement[s] for search warrants; [they] merely substitute particularity
of person for particularity of place."74 The Government contends that it
will concentrate its surveillance only on the target ofthe investigation, but
in reality all conversations, including those conducted by third parties, will
be wiretapped.75 To use one example, "if the government suspects that a
particular target uses different pay phones at Boston's Logan Airport, then
the government would have the power to wire all the public telephones at
Logan Airport
and the discretion to decide which conversations to
"6
monitor. ,

In Steagald v. UnitedStates,77 police
relied on the warrant (arrest warrant for Ricky Lyons) as legal
authority to enter the home of a third person based on their
belief that Ricky Lyons might be a guest there .... [W]hile
the warrant in this case may have protected Lyons from an
unreasonable seizure, it did absolutely nothing to protect

71. Id.
72. Olsen, supra note 13, 14.
73. USAPA, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 206, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Section 206, ROVING
SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT OF 1978, reads:
Section 105(c)(2)(B) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)(B)) is amended by inserting, "or in circumstances where the
Court finds that the actions of the target of the application may have the effect of
thwarting the identification of a specified person, such other persons," after
"specified person."
Id.
74.
Nov. 12,
75.
76.
77.

Tracey Maclin, On Amending the Fourth:Another Grave Threat to Liberty, NAT. L. J.,
2001, at A20, availableat http://www.law.com.
See id.
Id.
451 U.S. 204 (1981).
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petitioner's privacy interest in being free from an
unreasonable invasion and search of his home.78
Not only do roving telephone wiretaps invade the expectation of privacy
of uncounted third parties, but the extension of roving surveillance to the
computer equipment of a target also subjects "the e-mail messages of
thousands of individuals" to government search.7 9 Because gover'nment
agents can now decide when, where, and how often to monitor
communications, Steagald strongly suggests that this expansion of the
government's power to monitor its citizens runs counter to the Fourth
"was intended to check, and not expand, police power
Amendment, which
80
and discretion."
The USAPA achieves a great deal of its expansion of investigative
authority by making changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA).8 The FISA formerly granted FBI agents expanded authority to
conduct warrantless surveillance, provided that the purpose of the
investigation is to obtain "foreign intelligence information.""2 The FISA
defines "foreign intelligence information" as:
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United
States person is necessary to, the ability of the United States
to protect against(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of
a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence
service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a
foreign power; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign
territory that relates to, and if concerning a United States
person is necessary to(A) the national defense or the security of the United
States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United
States.83

78. Id. at 213 (explanation added).
79. Maclin, supra note 74.

80. Id.
81. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000).
82. See id. § 1802.

83. Ied§ 1801(e).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 5
FLORIDA L4WREVIEW

[Vol. 54

Section 218 of the USAPA amends the criteria for FISA authority by
"striking 'the purpose' and inserting 'a significant purpose' ' 4 of the
investigation, meaning any relation of the investigation to foreign
intelligence is enough. This permits law enforcement agents to obtain
expanded authority to conduct surveillance under the FISA by merely
asserting that the investigation had something to do with foreign
intelligence."5
The FISA was enacted in 1978 to provide a "firewall" between foreign
and domestic intelligence gathering after the nation was shocked by
revelations of extensive surveillance of U.S. citizens by the FBI, often on
the basis of ethnicity or political beliefs.8 6 During the 1960s and 1970s, the
FBI conducted controversial surveillance of Vietnam War and civil rights
protesters, including Martin Luther King. 7 By requiring that the primary
purpose of a wiretap or search was to obtain foreign intelligence, the FISA
forbade the use of the surveillance authority in criminal cases without
meeting the probable cause standard. 8 Supporters of the USAPA cite
United States v. Truong Dinh Hung 9 in their claim that President Carter
"personally authorized warrantless physical searches by the FBI.""0 But the
court made it clear in Truong that "once surveillance becomes primarily
a criminal investigation, the courts are entirely competent to make the
usual probable cause determination, and because, importantly, individual
privacy interests come to the fore and government foreign policy concerns
recede when the government is primarily attempting to form the basis for
a criminal prosecution."9 ' The expanded authority granted by the USAPA
is certain to resurrect the practice of investigating Americans with
unpopular political views, the same practice that prompted the original
limiting language in the FISA.92

84. USAPA, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272(2001). Section 218 reads: "Sections
104(a)(7)(B) and section 303(a)(7)(B) (50 U.S.C. 1804(a)(7)(B) and 1823(a)(7)(B)) ofthe Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 are each amended by striking 'the purpose' and inserting 'a
significant purpose."' Id.
85. See id.
86. How the USA-PatriotAct EnablesLaw Enforcement to Use IntelligenceAuthorities to
1-2
Circumvent the PrivacyProvisionsAfforded in CriminalCases, ACLU Freedom Network
(Oct. 23, 2001), at http://www.aclu.org/congress/l102301i.html [hereinafter, Intelligence
Authorities].
87. Id. 2.
88. Id. 3.
89. 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
90. See, e.g., U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee, The Anti-TerroristBill in Context:
Is Safety a Civil Right? 8 (Oct. 26, 2001j, at http://www.senate.gov/-rpe/releases/1999/
frl02601 .htm.
91. Truong, 629 F.2d at 915.
92. See generally IntelligenceAuthorities, supra note 86.
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Following passage of the USAPA, Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, observed that "[tihe bill enters new and
uncharted territory by breaking down traditional barriers between law
enforcement and foreign intelligence."'9 3 Even under the pre-USAPA
constraints, FISA wiretaps exceeded the number of wiretaps for all
domestic criminal investigations combined.94
Another power given to the government is the "Authority to Share
Grand Jury Information" granted by section 203 of the USAPA.9 5 Grand
juries have vast power to gather information in secret, "including
testimony, wiretap transcripts, phone records, business records or medical
records."96 Section 203 amends Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure97 to eliminate the need for a court order to permit prosecutors
to share grand jury information with other government agencies.98
Therefore, the FBI can now give grand jury information to the CIA
without a court order.9 9 As long as the information involves a nonAmerican or involves "foreign intelligence," agencies can distribute,
without limitation, information gathered about Americans. 00
Finally, section 213 of the USAPA permits agencies to execute socalled "sneak and peek" warrants without notifying the target of the
search.' ° This section expands the ability of the government to conduct

93. McGee, supra note 6 (quoting Senator Leahy).
94. See USA PatriotAct Boosts Government Powers While Cutting Back on Traditional
Checks and Balances: An ACLU LegislativeAnalysis, ACLU FREEDOM NETWORK 16 (Nov. 1,
2001), at http://www.aclu.org/congress/ 110101 a.html [hereinafter Checks and Balances].
95. USAPA, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203(a), 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
96. McGee, supra note 6.

97. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
98. McGee, supra note 6.
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. USAPA, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 213, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Section 213, AUTHORITY
FOR DELAYING NOTICE OF THE EXECUTION OF A WARRANT, provides that:
Section 3103a of title 18, United States Code, is amended-

(1) by inserting "(a) In General."-before "In addition"; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
(b) Delay-With respect to the issuance of any warrant or court order

under this section, or any other rule of law, to search for and seize any property
or material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation of the laws
of the United States, any notice required, or that may be required, to be given may
be delayed if(1) the court finds reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate
notification of the execution of the warrant may have an adverse result (as defined
in section 2705);
(2) the warrant prohibits the seizure of any tangible property, any wire or
electronic communication (as defined in section 2510), or, except as expressly
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secret "black bag" searches in every criminal case.° 2 Under the USAPA
the government need only assert that notice "may" seriously jeopardize an
investigation. °3
The result of this provision is that citizens are not provided with notice
of a search warrant and, therefore, have no opportunity to contest the
warrant's validity or accuracy before an intrusion of their home or office
occurs.0 4 Considering the possibility of the police showing up at the door
with a warrant to search one's house, Senator Feingold commented,
You look at the warrant and say, "yes, that's my address, but
the name on the warrant isn't me." And the police realize a
mistake has been made and go away. If you're not home, and
the police have received permission to do a "sneak and peek"
search, they can come into your house, look around, and
leave, and may never have to tell you.0 5
As one commentator put it, "[t]hese so-called 'sneak and peek'
provisions treat the Fourth Amendment protections as if they were written
in pencil, easily erased and malleable, tied to the crisis-of-the-day level of
paranoia. '
III. HISTORY OF CRISIS LEGISLATION
When I think of the progress we have made over the last
thirty years, I look upon our system of civil liberties with
some satisfaction, and a certain pride. There is considerably
less to be proud about, and a good deal to be embarrassed
about, when one reflects on the shabby treatment civil

provided in chapter 121, any stored wire or electronic information, except where
the court finds reasonable necessity for the seizure; and
(3) the warrant provides for the giving of such notice within a reasonable
period of its execution, which period may thereafter be extended by the court for
good cause shown.
Id.
102. See Checks and Balances, supra note 94,

7.

103. Senator Russell Feingold, Statement on the Anti-Terrorism Bill from the Senate Floor
(Oct. 25,2001), availableat http:llfeingold.senate.gov/releasesl0/1 0/102501 at.html [hereinafter
FeingoldStatement].

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Brock N. Meeks, First, BrandAll the Children:Cyber-liberties Swept Away by Tidal

Wave of Security Concerns 8 (Oct. 24, 2001), at http://www.msnbc.com/news/646793.asp.
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liberties have received in the United States during times of
war and perceived threats to its national security.'rr
-Justice William Brennan, 1987
In 1798, the Alien Enemies Act permitted the President of the United
States to "order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and
safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are
concerned in any reasonable or secret machinations against the
government thereof, to depart out of the territory of the United States.' 0 8
The "Alien and Sedition Acts," prompted by the imminent prospect of war
with France, made it illegal to "'write, print, utter or publish.., any false,
scandalous and malicious writing . . . against' the U.S. Government,
Congress, or the President [if accompanied by] the intent 'to bring
them.., into contempt or disrepute.""10 9 This statute, written "[w]hen the
ink had barely dried on the First Amendment,"" 0 permitted the
government to stifle and punish political opposition. It was the natural
product of a new nation, unsure of its continued existence and lacking a
history ofjurisprudence to rely upon for guidance."' After the crisis had
passed, all those convicted under the Alien and Sedition Acts were
pardoned by President Jefferson, and Congress repaid most of their
fines." 2 But events would soon show that America had not learned from
the experience.
Shortly after the outbreak of the Civil War, President Lincoln
suspended the writ of habeas corpus and had between 20,000 and 30,0003
persons arrested and detained by military personnel without charges."
Some received no trials; all were held at the whim of authorities, lacking
any access to the due process guarantees provided by civil courts." 4 The
American public was strongly in favor of these actions, but in Ex parte
Merryman,"5 Chief Justice Taney found them to be unconstitutional." 6

107. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties
in Times of Security Crisis, Address to the Law School of Hebrew University, Jerusalem, at 1 (Dec.
22, 1987), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/resources/downloads/nation-securitybrennan.pdf.
108. Alien Enemies Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (emphasis omitted); see also Anita
Ramasastry, Indefinite Detention Based Upon Suspicion: How the PatriotAct Will DisruptMany
Lawful Immigrants' Lives 27 (Oct. 25, 2001), at http:lvrit.news.findlaw.om/commentary/
20011005_ramasastry.html.
109. Brennan, supra note 107, at 2 (omissions in original) (footnote omitted).

110. Id.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Seeid.
Id. at3.
Id.
Id.
17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
Brennan, supra note 107, at 3.
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Chief Justice Taney was subsequently accused by the press of siding with
traitors."17 The New York Tribune wrote, "[w]hen reason stalks about in
arms, let decrepit Judges give place to men capable of detecting and
crushing it."' " After the war was over, cooler heads prevailed, and in Ex
parte Milligan"9 the Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to establish a
system of military tribunals and suspend habeas corpus in any locality
where civil courts are open and functioning. 2 ° This was to represent
America's equal application of civil liberties to both times of war and
times of peace.'
This lofty aspiration lasted until the next big scare. 2 The Espionage
Act of 1917123 criminalized the publication of any false material that might
endanger the success of U.S. military operations or recruiting, and allowed
for the confiscation of any such materials. 24 This Act provided a vehicle
for the government to confiscate anti-war films and literature.2 5 Later the
statute was expanded to include the willful publication, utterance, writing
or printing of "disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the
U.S. form 26of government, Constitution, flag, or its military forces or
uniform."'
The Espionage Act of 1917 was no mere exercise in rhetoric: over
2,000 individuals were prosecuted under the Act, mainly for criticizing the
war or for the act of contradicting statements made by President Wilson.'27
Other offenders ran afoul of the Act by making statements on such diverse
subjects as religion, taxation, and the draft.'
The internment of 120,000 Japanese citizens during the Second World
War is a more recent, and therefore more nagging instance of a measure
that was necessitated by an imminent threat to national security-in this
case the presence on American soil of disloyal Japanese-Americans. 9
Although the Supreme Court refused to second-guess the exigencies of
national security in Hirabayashiv. UnitedStates,130 the action was later

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
71 U.S. (4Wall.)2(1866).
Brennan, supra note 107, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (1917).
Brennan, supra note 107, at 3.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 6; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 598 (9th Cir. 1987).
320 U.S. 81 (1943). The Court stated:
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found to be without factual basis. "[I]n 1980 Congress established the

Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, which
reviewed all the evidence and concluded that... a grave injustice" had
been committed, "not justified by [any] military necessity," but rather the
product of "race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political
leadership."''
The Commission authorized reparations for those
affected. 2
The arrival of the Nuclear Age prompted another era of national
anxiety, this time in response to the Red Menace.' To protect the nation
from the threat within, Congress "enacted various laws including the
"'
Internal Security Act of 1950 and the Communist Control Act of 1954. 34
In Dennis v. United States,135 the Supreme Court, using the "clear and
present danger" test,' 36 upheld the conviction of Communist Party
members. The Court ruled that a finding of this "clear and present danger"
37
subordinated any constitutional rights of free speech and assembly.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the play, "A Man for All Seasons," Sir Thomas More
questions the bounder Roper whether he would level the
forest of English laws to punish the Devil. "What would you
do?" More asks, "Cut a great road through the law to get after
the Devil?" Roper affrmns, "I'd cut down every law in
England to do that." To which More replies:

we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of
Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and
strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained. We cannot say that the
war-making branches of the Government did not have ground for believing that
in a critical hour such persons could not readily be isolated and separately dealt
with, and constituted a menace to the national defense and safety, which
demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard against it.
Id. at 99.
131. Brennan, supra note 107, at 6 (quotation marks omitted).
132. See 50 USCS Appx § 1989 (1988) (providing apology and restitution for the internment
of citizens and permanent aliens of Japanese ancestry).
133. See Brennan, supra note 107, at 7.
134. Id. at 7.
135. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
136. Id. at 515. The"clear and present danger" test was formulated in Schenk v. UnitedStates,
249 U.S. 47 (1919). In Schenck, the defendant and others were convicted of conspiracy to violate
the Federal Espionage Act of 1917 for distributing leaflets that promoted military insubordination
and the obstruction of military recruitment. Id. at 47-48. Utilizing the "clear and present danger"
balancing test, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. Id. at 52-53.
137. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at513.
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"And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned
round on you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all
being flat? This country's planted thick with laws from coast
to coast ...and if you cut them down... d'you really think
you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then?
Yes, I'd
give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's
138
sake."'
Among the myriad troubling questions associated with the USAPA, the
most fundamental is whether there was a need for it at all. The government
never argued that the legal restraints on law enforcement authorities
prevented them from stopping the terrorists of September 11 th, or from
investigating the crime. 139 The FBI already had the power and the
technology to monitor telephone and Internet communications in situations
involving air piracy and the destruction of aircraft, 40 as well as under the
FISA.' 4 ' Existing law provided for roving wiretaps if law enforcement
agents could demonstrate that the target of the investigation was changing
phones in order to thwart detection.142 The government could already
wiretap any person suspected of working for a foreign government or
organization. 4 3 The government already had "sneak and peek" authority
to search without notification, if certain criteria were met: if an agent
demonstrated that either an individual's safety would be endangered,
someone would flee, evidence would be destroyed, witnesses would be
intimidated or an investigation would otherwise bejeopardized or delayed,
this authority could be granted.'44
One of the most far-reaching effects of the USAPA is the removal of
the review of a "neutral and detached magistrate" from the process of
citizen surveillance. Many of the provisions that do involve some judicial
oversight require that the order be granted if the application is properly
filled out. 45 Under the broader FISA provisions that now apply to the
investigation of domestic crimes under the USAPA, no probable cause is
necessary to justify an intelligence wiretap.'46

138. FeingoldStatement, supra note 103.
139. EEFAnalysisofthe Provisionsofthe USA PATRIOTAct ThatRelate to OnlineActivities,
-A 3, 36-38, 43, 46, 49, 51-52, 54 (Oct. 31, 2001), at http:lwww.eff.orglPrivacy/Surveillancel
Terrorismmilitias/20011031 eff usapatriot__analysis.html.
140. Judicial Oversight,supra note 38, 2.
141. Checks and Balances, supra note 94, 15.
142. JudicialOversight,supra note 38, 10.
143. Ramasastry, supranote 108, 24.
144. How the USA-Patriot Act Expands Law Enforcement "Sneak and Peek" Warrants,
ACLU Freedom Network 2,4 (Oct. 23,2001), athttp://www.aclu.orglcongresslll02301b.html.
145. See. e.g., Intelligence Authorities,supra note 86, 13.
146. JudicialOversight,supra note 38, 4.
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Many of the provisions of the USAPA are disturbingly vague. Section
808 expands the definition of terrorism to crimes "relating to protection of
computers."147 This language could encompass a wide range of offenses
unrelated to terrorism, such as the sale of software that fails to perform
correctly, posting incorrect or misleading content on web pages, and

147. USAPA, Pub. L.No. 107-56, § 808,115 Stat. 272 (2001). Section 808, DEFINITION OF
FEDERAL CRIME OF TERRORISM, reads in part:
Section 2332b of title 18, United States Code, is amended(1) in subsection (f), by inserting "and any violation of section 35 1(e), 844(e),
844(f)(1), 956(b), 1361, 1366(b), 1366(c), 1751(e), 2152, or 2156 of this title,"
before "and the Secretary"; and
(2) in subsection (g)(5)(B), by striking clauses (i) through (iii) and inserting
the following:
(i) section 32 (relating to destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities), 37
(relating to violence at international airports), 81 (relating to arson within special
maritime and territorialjurisdiction), 175 or 175b (relating to biological weapons),
229 (relating to chemical weapons), subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) of section 351
(relating to congressional, cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination and
kidnaping), 831 (relating to nuclear materials), 842(m) or (n) (relating to plastic
explosives), 844(f)(2) or (3) (relating to arson and bombing of Government
property risking or causing death), 844(i) (relating to arson and bombing of
property used in interstate commerce), 930(c) (relating to killing or attempted,
killing during an attack on a Federal facility with a dangerous weapon), 956(a)(1)
(relating to conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or maim persons abroad), 1030(a)(1)
(relating to protection of computers), 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) resulting in damage as
defined in 1030(a)(5)(B)(ii) through (v) (relating to protection of computers),
1114 (relating to killing or attempted killing of officers and employees of the
United States), 1116 (relating to murder or manslaughter of foreign officials,
official guests, or internationally protected persons), 1203 (relating to hostage
taking), 1362 (relating to destruction of communication lines, stations, or
systems), 1363 (relating to injury to buildings or property within special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States), 1366(a) (relating to destruction
of an energy facility), 1751(a), (b), (c), or (d) (relating to Presidential and
Presidential staff assassination and kidnaping), 1992 (relating to wrecking trains),
1993 (relating to terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass
transportation systems), 2155 (relating to destruction of national defense
materials, premises, or utilities), 2280 (relating to violence against maritime
navigation), 2281 (relating to violence against maritime fixed platforms), 2332
(relating to certain homicides and other violence against United States nationals
occurring outside of the United States), 2332a (relating to use of weapons of mass
destruction), 2332b (relating to acts of terrorism transcending national
boundaries), 2339 (relating to harboring terrorists), 2339A (relating to providing
material support to terrorists), 2339B (relating to providing material support to
terrorist organizations), or 2340A (relating to torture) of this title.
Id. § 808(1)-(2)(i).
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deceptive Internet marketing schemes. 48 While these all may be serious
problems, they do not merit the abrogation of constitutional liberties.
Many critics question the motivation behind the USAPA. Senator
Feingold said that the USAPA "goes into a lot of areas that have nothing
to do with terrorism and have a lot to do with the government and the FBI
having a wish list of things they want to do.', 149 A principal concern of
critics is the broad expansion of FISA surveillance authority, allowing its
use in primarily criminal investigations.' 50 This has the effect of converting
the FBI's mission from solving crime to intelligence gathering, and
effectively "put[s] the CIA back in the business of spying on
Americans."' 5 ' The USAPA also creates the new crime of "domestic
terrorism"'5 that could transform protesters into terrorists if they are
associated with conduct that endangers human life.' 53
Others are skeptical about the promised benefit of increased security.
Carole Samdup, spokesperson for Democracy and Rights, claims "[a]ll this
technology has existed for years and we still haven't arrested anyone
(using it) .... Even Timothy McVeigh was under surveillance."' 54 Boaz
Guttman, former terrorism investigator in the Israeli police force,
downplays the utility of technologies such as Carnivore, a program that
monitors and filters all electronic communications in search of particular
terms.
There is no miracle at all with wiretapping. It did not prevent
crime even in Red Russia. What if terrorists use coded
messages. He [sic] calls the bomb "cake" and the target "my
mother in law." You can intercept 'til tomorrow, 'til next
week [and not stop terrorism] .... If somebody thinks that
with all this tracing alone, he will defeat terror, as I said to an
important person in your country, "Sorry, you are sleeping in
the middle of the day. 15
More fundamentally, the focus of the USAPA on expanding
government surveillance is misguided, because the underlying assumption
148. Susan Evoy, Comments on LegislativeProposalsto ProtectNationalSecurityand Their

Impact on the Communications Infrastructure, COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS FOR SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY T 8 (Oct. 2001), at http://www.cpsr.org/issues/ICACComments.html (last visited
Dec. 11, 2001).
149. Hentoff, supra note 7, 9 20 (quoting Senator Feingold).
150. Judicial Oversight,supranote 38, 9113-14.
151. Checks and Balances, supra note 94, 9 20.
152. USAPA, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802.
153. Checks and Balances, supra note 94, IN 8-9.
154. Bob Sullivan, Warming to Big Brother, MSNBC, 9 28, at http://www.msnbc.ru/news/
654959 (last visited Dec. 12, 2001).
155. Id. 99 29, 31 (quotation marks omitted).
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that the attacks of September 11 resulted from the government's limited
power to collect information is erroneous. For example, after the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center, the FBI discovered that it already had
in its possession detailed plans and maps of the attack at the time it
occurred. 56 The history of intelligence indicates that most failures result
from a lack of proper implementation of procedures already in place,
rather than the need for new procedures.' 57
No restraint was ever placed on government power without a history
of government abuse. As far back as 1706 the Framers were aware of the
dangers of multiple-specific search warrants, after colonial officials used
them to search every home in New Hampshire.158 Congressional concern
led to the Collection Act of 1789, which limited federal searches to single
structures and eliminated "wide-ranging exploratory searches."' 9
Because these limitations are intended to remedy government
overreaching, no one ever proposes lifting governmental restraints until the
memory of abuse has time to fade, usually a generation or two after the
excesses. No doubt the future will bring vivid reminders of the original
reasons for the restraints that Congress has so hastily lifted from the
powers of the government over its citizens.
Ironically, blanket monitoring of citizens could have the same chilling
effect on democracy that terrorism does. 6 Justice Marshall, dissenting in
Smith, remarked that
[p]ermitting governmental access to telephone records on less
than probable cause may... impede certain forms of political
affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are the hallmark of
a truly free society. Particularly given the Government's
previous reliance on warrantless telephonic surveillance to
trace reporters' sources and monitor protected political
activity, I am unwilling to insulate use of pen registers from
independent judicial review.'
One imagines what Justice Marshall would have said about the legislation
before us.
Daniel Bryant, Assistant Attorney General for the Department of
Justice, observed that "[a]s the Commander-In-Chief, the President must
be able to use whatever means necessary to prevent attacks upon the
United States; this power, by implication, includes the authority to collect
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Donohue & Walsh, supra note 12.
See id.
Maclin, supra note 74.
Id.
Evoy, supranote 148, 7.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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information necessary for its effective exercise."' 62 No one can gainsay
this; however, the means utilized by the President must be subject to
constitutional constraints.163 The President is not above the law and not
above the Constitution."6
Civil liberties are anathema to government. Since the first
collectivization of humans, governments have jealously guarded their
powers, only reluctantly ceding increments of control to their subjects.
That is the miracle of America. In spite of historical excesses, this nation
has always returned to the principles of human rights and guarantees
envisioned by the Founding Fathers.
Justice Brennan, in his 1987 address to the Law School of Hebrew
University in Jerusalem, expressed frustration at America's episodic
abandonment of civil liberties in times of crisis. 6 Justice Brennan noted
that "[a]fter each perceived security crisis ended, the United States has
remorsefully realized that the abrogation of civil liberties was unnecessary.
But it has proven unable to prevent itself from repeating the error when the
next crisis came along."' 66
There is no doubt that the expanded powers incorporated into the
USAPA will be used improperly, especially given the limited oversight
provisions,"
Political enemies will be targets of espionage;"'
embarrassing information about select individuals will once again be
"leaked." Perhaps terrorists will even be freed after incriminating evidence
is suppressed
on constitutional grounds (if they manage to obtain a civil
16 9
trial).
Eventually, the stories of governmental excess will be publicized, and
the public will realize the damage that has been done to personal privacy.
This has already occurred with well-meaning legislation such as RICO 7 '
and other asset forfeiture provisions that have succeeded in injuring
average citizens while failing to remedy the problems they were intended
to address. History shows that individuals will suffer gravely before the
damage is recognized, and once again America will realize that a society
that sacrifices its freedom for security achieves neither.

162. Intelligence Authorities, supra note 86,
8-9.
163. See id. $ 10.
164. Id.
165. Brennan, supra note 107, at 1.
166. Id.
167. See Intelligence Authorities, supranote 86, In 13-14.
168. Id. 115.
169. Id. 16.
170. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993) (involving the seizure of an
adult bookstore's assets under RICO forfeiture provisions).
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